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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\ 
DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC. Plaintiff, I 
vs. 
LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT COUN-
CIL 67, WESTERN CONFERENCE 
OF TEAMSTERS, THE INTERNA- :. 
TIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF \1 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WARE-
HOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF 
AMERICA, AFL-CIO, et al., 
Defendants . . 
I 
Case No. 
8823 
PETITION FOR A REHEARING AND BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT THEREOF 
Come now the defendants and appellants in the above 
entitled action and jointly and severally respectfully petition 
the Court to grant a rehearing in the above entitled cause for 
the reason and upon the ground that in its opinion heretofore 
written the Court erred in the following particulars: 
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POINT I 
ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WAS 
AN INDUCEMENT OF NEUTRAL EMPLOYEES TO ACT 
IN CONCERT AS REQUIRED BY SEC. 303 OF THE ACT, 
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS OPINION SOLELY 
ON INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE WHICH HAD NO PRO-
BATIVE VALUE AND WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO 
OTHER EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A UNI-
FIED OPERATION BETWEEN CACHE VALLEY DAIRY 
ASSOCIATION AND PLAINTIFF AND THEREBY ALSO 
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 WHICH CONSISTED OF THE 
"MOORE DRY DOCK" CRITERIA PERTAINING TO THE 
AMBULATORY PICKETING FEATURE OF THE CASE. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND ERROR 
IN THE TRIAL COURT'S INVOLVEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
OF CERTIFICATION IN THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
JURY OVER DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION. THIS ERROR 
IS ESPECIALLY OBVIOUS SINCE THIS COURT DOES 
DECIDE THAT THE ISSUE OF CERTIFICATION HAD 
NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS CASE. 
v 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING DEFENDANTS 
OF RIGHTS GUARANTEED THEM BY THE CONSTITU-
TION, THE COMMON LAW, AND THE FEDERAL 
STATUTE. 
POINTY 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THE INTERNATIONAL IS A STRANGER TO THIS 
CAUSE. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE IS EXEMPT FROM LIA-
BILITY. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS IS EX-
EMPT FROM THE DEFINITION OF THE ACT. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE 
IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING 
BY THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF HAD A LICENSE OR 
PERMIT TO CONDUCT ITS INTERSTATE HAULING 
BUSINESS. 
VI 
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POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS A CONTRACT CARRIER AT THE 
TIMES INVOLVED IN THIS CONTROVERSY. 
POINT X 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS 
NOT ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING TO 
ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE AFFIDAVIT OF MR. COR-
BETT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT XI 
THE COURT ERRED BY IN EFFECT HOLDING THAT 
THE BOOKS OF PLAINTIFF WERE RECEIVED IN EVI-
DENCE AND PROPERLY SO RECEIVED, AND THAT AS 
SUCH TENDED TO SUPPORT CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. 
POINT XII 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVI-
DENCE AS TO DAMAGES WAS NOT SO SPECULATIVE 
AS NOT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT. 
POINT XIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVI-
DENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING BY 
THE JURY THAT DORMANS REFUSED TO PURCHASE 
MORE CHEESE BECAUSE OF THE PICKETING. 
VII 
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POINT XIV 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVI-
DENCE DOES NOT REQUIRE A FINDING BY THE JURY 
THAT THE DORMANS WERE WILLING TO CONTINUE 
TO PURCHASE MORE CHEESE FROM THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT XV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING THE VERDICT. 
POINT XVI 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANTS A NEW TRIAL. 
We, the undersigned attorneys for the defendants herein, 
certify that in our opinion there is merit to the foregoing claim 
that the Court committed errors in the particulars above speci-
fied, and that a rehearing should be granted to the end that 
the errors complained of be corrected. 
Clarence M. Beck 
A. Park Smoot 
Elias Hansen 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WAS 
AN INDUCEMENT OF NEUTRAL EMPLOYEES TO ACT 
IN CONCERT AS REQUIRED BY SEC. 303 OF THE ACT, 
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS OPINION SOLELY 
ON INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE WHICH HAD NO PRO-
BATIVE VALUE AND WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO 
OTHER EVIDENCE. 
In reviewing the record the court, as stated in the opinion, 
was to be guided by the principle that, "we must go along 
with the verdict unless it clearly is not supported by any sub-
stantial evidence." We proceed with this guiding principle in 
mind. 
Defendants, in denying liability relied on the basic premise 
that Dorman's employees were not appealed to by the picketing 
or otherwise, and that the appeal had an effect only on the 
employer and a supervisory employee; that the picketing neces-
sarily could not have been an appeal to Dorman's employees, 
because at the time of the picketing, there were no employees 
to be appealed to and that, therefore, since there was no show-
ing of a plurality of neutral employees, there was necessarily 
no appeal for a concert of action among employees as required 
by the act; and that the only work stoppage came about by the 
order of the foreman, Rosen, after consulting with his em-
ployer, the Dorman brothers. 
In disagreeing with defendants on this ~oint, the Court 
says: 
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"Dorman contacted Gossner in Utah and advised him 
that there was a picket line in front of his place of 
business picketing Dairy Distributors' trucks, advising 
that his employees would not cross the picket line and 
did not want to unload the cheese." 
This quote is substantially the language used in respond-
ent's brief in its statement of the facts, and this statement is 
premised only upon Gassner's heresay testimony on Page 16 
of the transcript wherein Gossner says: 
"I got a call from New York and it was Mr. Dorman 
that called and he told me that they had a picket line 
in front of their plant picketing their Distributor's 
truck and that his employees would not cross the picket 
line and did not want to unload the cheese." 
This evidence, coming into the record as it did, left de-
fendants without any chance to cross-examine the absent 
author of the statement. The mischief of such evidence is 
universally recognized. Even when not objected to, in this 
jurisdiction such evidence alone may not be the basis for a 
finding of fact or of a judgment, as will hereinafter be seen. 
In those jurisdictions where such evidence which enters the 
record without objection is permitted to support a finding of 
fact, the evidence is received subject to its inherent weakness 
or infirmities. The infirmities of this hearsay statement are 
these: if Dorman made the statement attributed to him by 
Gessner, using the plural "employees," he could have been 
saying it not as a statement of fact, but for its possible influence 
on Gessner; it is contrary to Rosen's testimony who said that 
he and Dorman alone decided not to unload; and the hearsay 
statement fails to give any idea as to the number of em-
ployees. It could have meant only Rosen the Supervisor and 
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one other, and such other person could have meant Gassner's 
own employee, Mr. Schenk. (See Tr. p. 2 34 11 22-24) . 
This telephone conversation between Gossner and Dorman 
was objected to by Mr. Elias Hansen. The hearsay testimony 
and Mr. Elias Hansen's objection and the trial court's ruling 
sustaining the objection begin on Line 20, Page 16, and end 
at Line 12, Page 17 of the transcript. Mr. Hansen's objection 
might have been slightly tardy and the matter probably should 
have been clarified by a motion to strike the hearsay testimony 
above quoted, but this failure does not make the hearsay 
testimony probative. It is still incompetent and may not be 
used to establish defendants' liability. 
That hearsay evidence alone, without other competent, 
substantial evidence, cannot support a finding of fact or a 
judgment is well settled in this state. The problem has arisen 
more frequently in industrial compensation cases where an 
interpretation of 35-1-88 U.C.A. 1953 was required. This 
section provides that 
·'The commission shall not be bound by the usual 
common law or statutory rules of evidence * * * ." 
In spite of this statutory relaxing of the rules of evidence, 
"this Court has uniformly held that hearsay testimony is ad-
missible, but just as uniformly held that a finding of fact can-
not be based solely upon hearsay evidence." Ogden Iron Works 
et al v. Industrial Commission et al, 102 P. 492, 132 P2d 
376. See also Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 74 U. 103, 277 P. 206, where the Court says: "The re-
port is hearsay evidence and it has become a well-established 
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rule in this jurisdiction that hearsay evidence alone will not 
support an award of compensation." 
In Ephraim Willow Creek Irrigation Company v. Olson, 
70 Utah 95, 258 P 216, 222, 227, an attempt to establish an 
agency relationship by hearsay evidence was objected to, and 
when overruled by the Court an exception was not taken. This 
Court in dealing with the failure to make an exception to the 
trial court's ruling said: 
"Although the representation that he was water 
master of Ephraim Willow Creek Irrigation Company 
was not specifically excepted to, it was so obnoxious 
to the.~eneral rule that we hold it to be of no probative 
value. 
According to the annotator at 104 ALR 1130, 1135, the 
Ephraim Willow Creek Irrigation Company ruling places Utah 
in the minority view category, which view is well expressed 
by the Texas Com. App. Court: 
"Evidence in itself wholly incompetent and there-
fore without probative force, gains no vitality because 
admitted without objection. It will not support a verdict 
by a jury or a finding of fact by a Court." 290 S.W. 529. 
A statement of the majority rule with its qualification as 
to "infirmities" and then the minority rule (followed by Utah) 
is found at 88 C.J.S. 299 (Trial, para. 153): 
"Hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, has 
been held to have probative value, and should be con-
sidered and given its natural probative effect, subject 
to any infirmatit•e suggestion due to its inherent weak-
ness, and may establish a material fact in issue, support 
a finding, and sustain a verdict or judgment. However, 
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such evidence should be given only the weight to which 
it is entitled, and the failure to object adds no weight 
to the evidence if intrinsically it had none. In some 
jurisdictions it has been held that hearsay evidence, 
although admitted without objection, is without pro-
bative force, is incompetent to establish a material fact 
in issue, and will not sustain a finding or sustain a 
verdict or judgment when unsupported by other evi-
dence." 
And again at 32 C.J.S. 1077 (Evidence para. 1034): 
rrEvidence intrinsically destitute of probative quality 
acquires no new attribute in point of weight by its pro-
duction in the case. While some authorities have held 
differently as to evidence admitted without objection 
* * *, according to a number of authorities wholly 
incompetent evidence possesses, and should be given 
no probative force, and the admission of such evidence 
cannot raise an issue or form the basis of a verdict, 
.finding, or judgment." (Emphasis ours.) 
The parts above emphasized state the view followed m 
the Utah cases, supra. 
Later on in the opinion, this Court in discussing the prob-
lem of appealing to employees, says this: 
"As to the matter of who was induced to act, we 
cannot agree with defendants that there was no evi-
dence of any appeal or inducement directed to non-
supervisory employees to refuse to unload or handle 
the plaintiff's commodities, because the union repre-
sentatives talked only to the Dormans and the foreman, 
Rosen." 
The Court has here apparently misunderstood defendants' 
position. We do not say that there was no appeal to employees 
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because the union representatives talked only to the Dormans 
and the foreman, Rosen. What we do say is that there was no 
appeal to employees because there were no employees to 
appeal to. Immediately following the above quotation, the 
Court continues: 
"To contend so it to challenge the silent potency 
of a peaceful picket line, and is to ignore the very 
purpose of such a line: Persuasion. It is to blind one-
self to the words of the picket banner, with its pointed 
suggestion that loyal union members (Dorman was a 
union establishment) should not handle the cheese. 
Further, it would seem to give little credit to the under-
standing and reaction of Dorman's union employees 
by intimating that only the conversations of Rash 
and the others with Dorman and Rosen, and not the 
presence of or the suggestiveness of the picket banner, 
had anything to do with the refusal to handle the 
cheese and the subsequent demise of a profitable busi-
ness." 
We wish the Court to understand clearly that defendants 
are not unaware of the "silent potency of a peaceful picket 
line," and that the above quote indicates a misunderstanding of 
defendant's position in this case. The potency of picketing is 
such that it can and does influence consumers and the public in 
general and this in turn may influence an employer just as readi-
ly as if his employees were the object of the picketing. It is 
obvious that Dorman was also concerned about the effect the 
picketing had on Ristuccia, the man he had to bargain with 
as to the wages and working conditions of his employees. But 
whether it was consumers, the public in general, or Ristuccia 
that the Dormans were most concerned about, the effect was 
immediate and they had Rosen, the foreman, delay the un· 
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loading. Had there been no delay, the cheese would have been 
unloaded by Rosen and Schenk, Gassner's driver, at about 
7:00 a.m., before anyone else was there to unload. The picket-
ing started about 7:00 a.m. or before and lasted for about 
one hour, during which no employees were present other than 
the supervisory employee, Rosen. (See Tr. 234-6). 
If we eliminate the legally incompetent and factually 
improper assumption that the picket had an influence upon 
Dorman's employees, the two immediately preceding quotations 
of the Court are without significance, and we respectfully re-
quest the Court to re-examine the record in the light of this 
effort of defendants to bring clarification to the Court con-
cerning their position on the vital issue of liability. 
Next, we observe the following from the Court's decision: 
"The cold facts are that after enjoying congenial 
and profitable business relations with Dormans for 
more than two years with deliveries of cheese at least 
once a week, the first picket by the union agents ended 
all that," etc. 
We submit that liability does not rest on the fact that 
Gassner went out of the trucking business a short time subse-
quent to the picketing. Liability must rest, if at all, upon an 
appeal "to the employees of any employer to engage in a 
strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employ-
ment." Even though the picketing did influence the Dormans 
and their foreman Rosen, and even if plaintiffs were successful 
in showing such to be the cause of the cessation of the business 
of Dairy Distributors, Inc., the defendants would still not 
be liable for the loss, for such activity is within lawful bounds. 
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On the point, however, of what actually caused Gossner 
to shut down his trucking operation, we would like to call 
the Court's attention to the only reason for so doing, as revealed 
by the record: Gassner's Dairy Distributors, Inc., was not 
enjoying "profitable business relations" with anyone, but in-
stead was losing money in an economic activity for which he 
was neither trained, adequated equipped, nor licensed. 
On pages 2 39-240 of the transcript is the undisputed 
testimony of Schenk that Gossner had admitted as of April, 
19 55 (three months prior to the picketing) that he was losing 
money in the trucking operation. 
This testimony is entirely supported by plaintiff's exhibit 
No. 3 at Page 4, where there is shown that of gross sales 
amounting to more than one million dollars ($1,056,048.20) 
during the year ending September 30, 195 5, a net profit before 
taxes amounted to only $10,675.53. In examining the list of 
expenses for that fiscal year, there is no expense for managing 
the operation, nor are there any commissions paid for making 
the sales. How much should be paid a president and manager 
of a corporation which is enjoying a million dollar a year 
business? How much should be paid a man or men who sell 
a million dollars worth of various products~eese going one 
way and various items on the back haul? The payment of even 
a ridiculously low percentage of 1% for either of these func-
tions would wipe out the entire profit. And if both services 
are paid for at only 1%, then a serious loss is being suffered, 
and what Gossner told Schenk in April of 195 5 is completely 
in harmony therewith. But even if we don't allow any expense 
for these essential items which Gossner failed to list, and 
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assuming it to be legally proper to accept this particular list 
of expenses without question, we ask: What kind of law is it 
that permits a jury to speculate that there will be a future 
profit of $1,000.00 a month for more than eight years when 
the past percentage of profit on a million dollar gross business 
amounts to only 1% before taxes? Operating on such a razor-
slim margin, it appears obvious that a failure to pick up one 
or two back hauls, a slight miscalculation on price either in 
the buying or the selling of any of the articles handled, or 
experiencing any one of a great variety of probable economic 
adversities, and Gossner' s Dairy Distributors, Inc., would be 
losing money. Do not the foregoing considerations explain 
why Gossner stopped the business rather than make whatever 
adjustments an hour or so of peaceful picketing might have 
suggested? In this connection, we again refer the Court to 
Victor Dorman's testimony (Tr. 298-299) that if the plaintiff, 
Dairy Distributors, Inc., had continued to send cheese to the 
New York docks, Dormans would have continued to accept it 
which fact alone necessarily eliminates plaintiff's claims for 
damages, because its claim hinges on the false assumption that 
Dormans would not accept cheese delivered by the plaintiff. 
In view of the above, we respectfully request the Court 
to observe the prejudice against the defendants in the minds 
of the jurors which the large amount of the judgment neces-
sarily suggests. We urge upon the Court that the amount of 
the judgment was not only grossly excessive, but that any 
amount is totally void of support in the record. The self-
serving statement of Gossner that the company was making 
about $1,000.00 per month is contrary to all the facts in this 
case including those which are apparent from an analysis of 
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plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 which is, as far as this record is con-
cerned, plaintiffs primary and best evidence to support its 
claim for damages. Who can read this record and fairly con-
clude therefrom that Gossner really abandoned a one thousand 
dollar ($1,000.00) a month profit because his truck was pick-
eted? The last thing that would ever enter Gossner' s mind 
would be to abandon a fight with labor if labor threatened to 
cut him out of a profit. And is it not a reasonable conclusion 
from a careful study of the record that as soon as Gossner 
learned of the picketing, he saw his chance to abandon an 
unprofitable business and to blame the whole thing on his old 
antagonist, the union? 
Motivated as Gossner was against the union, it is probable 
that he was possessed of a stronger motivation: that of making 
a profit. And if his trucking business at this juncture were in 
a condition to be made a financial success, contrary to the afore-
mentioned evidence, it is reasonable to suppose that Gossner 
would have done what he could to minimize the "damage" 
supposedly being caused by the picketing. And if we are wrong 
in this assumption, then the only alternate conclusion is that 
he failed to do what was available for him to do in eliminating, 
or, at the very least, minimizing the damage. Since he con-
tinued to refuse either to bargain with the union, or, in lieu 
thereof, to ask for an injunction-which he had a right to do 
if there is any merit to his claim-then he loses his right to 
any damage because he did not do what he could have done 
to eliminate, or, at the least, to minimize the damage. 
The Court's opinion adds: 
"It is difficult to understand why the union would 
10 
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engage in this picketing if it were not designed to 
appeal to and influence the employees." 
We submit that whether we understand why the union 
picketed is, by itself, not an issue in this case. Until the plain-
tiff makes out its case on the point that there were employees 
who were induced to act in concert, this Court has no legally 
valid concern with the object of the picketing. Even so, appel-
lants in their oral argument before the Court and in their 
reply brief (page 22) gave what we believe to be good and 
valid reasons for the picketing even though there were no 
employees to be influenced by it. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A UNI-
FIED OPERATION BETWEEN CACHE VALLEY DAIRY 
ASSOCIATION AND PLAINTIFF AND THEREBY ALSO 
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 WHICH CONSISTED OF THE 
"MOORE DRY DOCK" CRITERIA PERTAINING TO THE 
AMBULATORY PICKETING FEATURE OF THE CASE. 
Without giving us the benefit of its analysis on this point, 
the Court simply says: 
"The concession of defendants that the Association 
and the plaintiff corporation were independent organi-
zations * * * disposes of any necessity to discuss ambu-
latory picketing and alter ego matters * * * ." 
But the facts in this case present a unity of operations 
situation between the plaintiff and the Association, even 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
though legally separated, which cannot properly be dismissed 
so lightly, nor at all. This is because Gassner had complete 
control of the hiring, firing, managing of, and policy-making 
concerning the employees of both the cheese processing op-
eration, through his contract (Exhibit 19) with the Association, 
and the hauling of that cheese through the Dairy Distributors, 
Inc., and he controlled and managed the Company, including 
the employees. (See Schenk's testimony, Tr. pp 240-241). 
That he alone also controlled and managed the employees 
and ran the entire cheese-making process is obvious from an 
examination of page 8 of the transcript and Exhibit 19, which 
is a contract between Cache Valley Dairy Association and 
Edwin Gossner, under which Gossner had the entire and 
complete and exclusive use and control of the cheese-making 
equipment and facilities. The contract specifically gives Gossner 
sole and exclusive responsibility to hire, control, direct and 
fire his own employees. All cheese-making employees were 
Gassner's employees and not the employees of the Cache Valley 
Dairy Association. Although the plant facilities were owned 
by the Association, the Association had nothing at all to do 
with the cheese-making process. Nor did it have anything to 
do with the marketing of the cheese, which was Gassner's 
exclusive right and responsibility. All that the Association 
members did was to deliver the milk for processing and receive 
their pro rata share of 85% of the gross income from Grossner's 
marketing operations. The dairy farmers of the co-op may have 
employed farm hands to help produce the milk, but that was 
each farmer's individual problem and such employees have 
never been involved in any employee-employer relationship of 
the Association. The only employees involved in the Associa-
12 
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tion's history of labor trouble have been Gassner's employees. 
The farmers, in their associated capacity, had no employees, 
at least there are none so far as the record shows. While the 
cooperative association of farmers was named Cache Valley 
Dairy Association, it was also a fact (and this is a very im-
portant distinction which may not have been sufficiently ob-
served by the Court) that Gassner's own cheese-processing 
operation which was his and his alone was also known as, 
and called, Cache Valley Dairy Association. Unless this dis-
tinction is recognized our point here will not be understood. 
That Gassner's cheese-processing operation was also called 
Cache Valley Dairy Association by Gassner himself, as well 
as those who did business with him, is evident from pages 
8 and 9 of the transcript and is implicit in the contract itself, 
especially when read in connection with the transcript. It is 
further evident from the use of the name Cache Valley Dairy 
Association used in the billings which Gassner, as cheese maker 
and marketer sent to Dorman (Tr. 290-295). And it is further 
evident from a study of Exhibit 4, the letter of August 22, from 
Victor Dorman to Ed Gassner. This letter is addressed to 
"Cache Valley Dairy Association, Smithfield, Utah, Dear Ed." 
This letter incidentally was offered in evidence by plain-
tiff (Tr. 99). Defendants objected because it was hearsay. 
Finding the Court still of a mind to consider the matter, a 
further objection was made that Exhibit 4 was not addressed 
to the plaintiff, Dairy Distributors, Inc. Since plaintiff was 
introducing the letter as one sent to the plaintiff, Dairy Dis-
tributors, Inc., it appears obvious that during the trial, Gassner, 
in the mind of his own counsel, was both Dairy Distributors, 
13 
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Inc., and Cache Valley Dairy Association. This is quite under-
standable in view of all the facts. 
In appellants' reply brief, we cited some Board cases to 
show that a set of facts such as we have in this case necessarily 
points to a unified operation. A recent decision of the U. S. 
Court of Appeals (First Circuit) further amplifies our position. 
The case is J. G. Roy and Sons Company v. National Labor 
Relations Board, January 27, 1958, 41 LRRM 2445, 251 F2d 
771. Under the facts of the case the Board had, on the basis 
only of substantial common ownership of the two com-
panies involved, ruled it to be a unified operation. But the 
Appeal Court, after reviewing the history of the cases on the 
subject decided that the Roy case did not meet the most essen-
tial requirement of the "ally" doctrine because "it was speci-
fically found that there was no actual common control over 
labor policies or over any other phase of the operations of Roy 
Lumber and Roy Construction." In reviewing the cases and 
pointing up the essentials of the "ally" doctrine, the Court says: 
"An analysis of the citations relied upon by the Board 
in support of its contention that two separate corporate 
entities may be regarded as one employer fully supports 
our conclusion that such a finding in the instant case 
is unwarranted. In Labor Board v. Stowe Spinning Co., 
336 U.S. 226, 23 LRRM 2371 (1949), the hall, which 
the four corporations unfairly refused the use of to 
the union for organizational purposes, was owned by 
those corporations jointly and was managed by an agent 
of the four corporations. See National Labor Relations 
Board v. Stowe Spinning Company, 165 F. 2d 609, 
610, 21 LRRM 2174 ( 4 Cir. 1947), reversed supra. 
It was clear that each of these four corporations had 
the same labor policy and they were as one enterprise, 
14 
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especially with regard to the hall which was the sub-
ject of the unfair labor practices. In National Labor 
Relations Board v. Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d 67, 
10 LRRM 483 (3 Cir. 1942), one employer was the 
wholly owned subsidiary of the other from whom it 
purchased materials at cost, which were later sold back 
again after certain manufacturing operations also at 
cost. The court held that what was important was the 
* * * degree of control over the labor relations in 
issue * * * ," supra at 71. Similarly in National Labor 
Relations Board v. Somerset Classics, 193 F.2d 613, 
29 LRRM 2331 (2 Cir. 1952), cert. denied sub nom, 
Modern Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. National Labor 
Relations Board et al., 344 U.S. 816, 30 LRRM 2711, 
while the two corporations were owned and controlled 
by members of the same family, there was the addi-
tional evidence that one corporation was entirely de-
pendent upon the other corporation for its work, the 
operations of both companies was closely integrated 
and the same individual was managing both companies 
during the period when the unfair labor practice oc-
curred. These elements of common management in-
tegrated operations and complete dependence by one 
company upon the other for its work were also present 
in National Labor Relations Board v. National Gar-
ment Co., 166 F.2d 233, 21 LRRM 2215 (8 Cir. 1948) 
cert. denied 334 U.S. 845, 22 LRRM 2189. In National 
Labor Rel. Board v. Federal Engineering Co., 153 
F.2d 233, 17 LRRM 792 ( 6 Cir. 1946), there was 
abundant evidence that the two legal entities, a cor-
poration and partnership, were engaged in one enter-
prise. Three of the four partners were top officials 
of the corporation, which owned the plant where the 
common enterprise was conducted and whose affairs 
were interrelated and intertwined with those of the 
partnership." 
In distinguishing the Roy case from the Irwin-Lyons 
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Lumber Co. case (25 LRRM 1092) which appellants cited in 
their reply brief the Appeals Court said: 
"The Board's 'straight line operation' doctrine is 
derived from its own decision in National Union of 
Marine Cooks and Stewards (Irwin-Lyons Lumber 
Co.), 87 NLRB 54, 25 LRRM 1092 (1949). In that 
case the primary employer was engaged in lobbying 
operations while the secondary employer transported all 
of the logs from the primary employer's logging site 
to its sawmill. Both employers were commonly owned, 
and, unlike the instant case, the president and active 
operating head of both companies was the same man. 
The secondary employer's operations were an abso-
lutely essential and integral part of the primary em-
ployer's enterprise." 
Because the facts of common control of the labor of the 
two companies in the case now before the Court, and because 
of their integration generally we believe that it is inescapable 
that this Court has committed error by not finding a unified 
or allied operation between the two companies in question 
and we, therefore, respectfully request this Court to reconsider 
this aspect of the case and render an opinion in harmony with 
the facts of this case and of the cases cited herein and in our 
briefs heretofore submitted. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND ERROR 
IN THE TRIAL COURT'S INVOLVEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
OF CERTIFICATION IN THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
JURY OVER DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION. THIS ERROR 
IS ESPECIALLY OBVIOUS SINCE THIS COURT DOES 
16 
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DECIDE THAT THE ISSUE OF CERTIFICATION HAD 
NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS CASE. 
Concerning the problem, the Court says: 
"To argue that certification or its equivalent had 
something to do with this case would be to assume that 
the Association, not the plaintiff, delivered the cheese 
to Dorman's in New York." 
The Court here agrees with us that certification has nothing 
to do with this case. We differ, however, as to the reasons for 
it. If the Court, after reconsidering the allied operations of 
the plaintiff and the Association, decides that it makes no 
difference which of these two companies delivered the cheese 
to Dormans in New York, and from such decides that certi-
fication, after all, is involved in the case, we then respectfully 
urge upon the Court that it review our position as to why 
certification is not involved, and further, to consider our 
position that if it is involved, that the Trial Court erred when, 
in instruction 5d, in quoting Section 303 (a) ( 2) it omitted 
the following qualification: "under the provisions of Section 
9 of the N.L.R.A." By such omission defendants were pre-
cluded from arguing to the jury that they were in an equiva-
lent status to a formal certification. We have observed that 
this Court says "we are not convinced by the arguments of 
counsel for defendants relating to an equivalence of certifi-
cation" because the employees which the union represented 
were no longer members of the union. Of course, if certifi-
cation is not a problem in the case, then it makes no difference 
whether there was an equivalence of certification. But if, upon 
a reconsideration, this question does become important we 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
wish to urge upon the Court our former arguments which are: 
( 1) That an equivalence of certification is determined by the 
rules of 9 (c) of the Act which as applied to the facts of this 
case preclude as pertinent the facts which have influenced this 
Court. ( 2) That the Board itself ordered Gossner to bargain 
with Defendant Local 976 and nothing was ever done, either 
by Gossner or his employees, to change that Order. 
We wish to remind the Court that the only reason de-
fendants argued the certification matter at all was because the 
plaintiffs and the trial court decided over our objection that 
it was pertinent to the case. But in giving an instruction about 
certification the trial Court erred in omitting the above-
mentioned qualification to the instruction it did give, which 
very much prejudiced defendants' position before the jury. 
In simple language the trial Court said in effect, "A labor 
union that is not certified is liable. Defendants are not certified, 
so they are liable." The jury was thus practically directed to 
bring in a verdict of liability. As the Court's opinion now 
stands, however, we are not a little confused and alarmed that 
this Court should take the trouble to specify three reasons for 
disagreeing with our arguments about certification, then pro-
ceed to say that the Court agrees with us that this issue has no 
business in the case anyway. The final irony, however, is that 
after saying that the issue of certification has no business in 
the case, this Court fails to find prejudicial error in the trial 
Court's involvement of the issue of certification in the in-
structions to the jury. (See Instructions 2 (b), 5-l (b), and 
5 (d)). 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING DEFENDANTS 
OF RIGHTS GUARANTEED THEM BY THE CONSTITU-
TION, THE COMMON LAW, AND THE FEDERAL 
STATUTE. 
In view of the Court's failure to agree with any of de-
fendants' points on the problem of liability, it seems essential 
that we say something about the rights which these defendants 
are given by the U. S. Constitution, the common law, and 
the Taft Act in the hope that the Court may, from a better 
vantage point, see what we believe to be errors in its opinion. 
The Taft Act specifically gives a union the right to pub-
licize a grievance. Paragraph 8 (c) reads: 
"The expressing of any views, arguments or opinions 
or the dissemination thereof whether in written, printed, 
graphic or visual form, shall not constitute or be evi-
dence of an unfair labor practice under any of the 
provisions of this Act if such expression contains no 
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.'' 
A traditional and oft used means of expressing a union's 
view is by a picket sign. Picketing is usually the particular 
means employed to disseminate a union's point of view during 
a strike. 
Section 13 of the Act recognizes and allows the right of a 
union to strike (or picket) . It reads: 
"Sec. 13. Nothing in this act except as specifically 
provided for herein shall be construed either to inter-
fere with or impede or diminish in any way the right 
to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications 
on that right." 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The United States Supreme Court in the case of NLRB 
vs. International Rice Milling Company, 341 U.S. 665, 28 
LLRM 2195, in interpreting Section 13, equates picketing 
with striking. In that case a union, although not certified or 
recognized as the representative of the employees of a certain 
mill, picketed the mill with the object of securing recognition 
of the union as the collective bargaining agent of the milJ 
employees. The "strike" was, therefore, nothing more than 
the picketing for recognition by a union whose members did 
not include employees of the employer who was being picketed. 
It was "stranger picketing" and there appears to have been 
no work stoppage. The Supreme Court bases its opinion in part 
on Section 13, which it quotes, and then says: 
"By Paragraph 13, Congress made it clear that 8(b) 
( 4) , and all other parts of the Act which otherwise 
might be read so as to interfere with, impede, or dimin-
ish the union's traditional right to strike, may be so 
read only if such interference, impediment or diminu-
tion is 'specifically provided for' in the Act. No such 
specific provision in 8(b) ( 4) reaches the incident here. 
The material legislative history supports this view." 
It is thus obvious that the Supreme Court recognizes that 
the word "strike" in Section 13 includes the word "picket" 
and as the facts of Rice Milling clearly establishes, this right 
to picket is not restricted to those employees who are picketing 
only their own employer. The Anti Injunction Act of 1932 
(Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, specifically Sees. 104(3) 
and 113 (c) ) and the Taft-Hartley Act (Sections 2 ( 3) and 
2(9)) and its predecessor, the Wagner Act, have for many 
years established this principle as part of a national labor 
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policy, which in turn was a statutory adoption of Court estab-
lished law. 
The Courts have long recognized that the very existence 
of trade unions depends on the right to publicize a dispute 
beyond the situs of a single employer-employee relationship 
and to extend the same to various sites of an entire trade or 
industry in an economically contiguous area. In briefly touch-
ing on this point we preface the same by referring to an error 
of the trial court in excluding some evidence proffered by 
defendants. Mr. Ballew had testified generally that the wages 
paid by Gossner in his cheese operation were lower than 
wages paid for similar work in the same competitive area 
(Tr. 306); and then when defendants offered to prove in 
specific cases where cheese was produced in Northern Utah 
and Southern Idaho that the wage rates were substantially 
higher in such plants than the wages being paid by Gossner, 
the Court sustained plaintiff's objection to such evidence 
(Tr. 331-332). This, we say, was error because it prevented 
defendants from disputing Mr. Thoresen's testimony on the 
subject (Tr. 179), and also prevented defendants from estab-
lishing the wage differential as a premise for arguing to the 
jury an important objective of the picketing which was to 
eliminate the substandard wages and working conditions in 
the area. That the union had the right to peacefully picket 
Gossner at his plant (or his trucks which handled the cheese 
wherever his trucks came to rest as we have elsewhere argued), 
and regardless of whether his employees were in good standing 
in, or even members of, the union is well stated by Chief 
Justice Taft in American Steel Foundaries vs. Tri-Cities Central 
Trades Council et al, 257 U. S. 184-209, 
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"Employees must make their combination extend 
beyond one shop. It is helpful to have as many as may 
be in the same trade in the community united, because 
in the competition between employees, they are bound 
to be affected by the standard of wages of their trade 
in the neighborhood. Therefore, they may use all 
lawful propaganda to enlarge their membership and 
especially among those whose labor at lower wages 
will injure their whole guild." 
In Apex Hosiery Company vs. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 
Justice Stone restated the proposition as follows (at Page 503) : 
"Furthermore, successful union activity, as for ex-
ample consummation of a wage agreement with em-
ployers, may have some influence on price competition 
by eliminating that part of such competition which 
is based on differences in labor standards. Since, in 
order to render a labor combination effective it must 
eliminate the competition from non-union made goods, 
an elimination of price competition based on differences 
in labor standards is the objective of any national labor 
organization." 
More lately, in American Federation of Labor vs. Swing, 
312 U.S. 321, at 326, the Court stated: 
"A state cannot exclude working men from peace-
fully exercising the right of free communication by 
drawing the circle of economic competition between 
employers and workers so small as to contain only an 
employer and those directly employed by him. The 
inter-dependence of economic interest of all engaged 
in the same industry has become a commonplace." 
A classic expression of the principle is contained in the 
often-quoted decision of Judge Andrews in Exchange Bakery 
vs. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, at 263; 157 N.E. 130, at 132: 
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"The purpose of a labor union to improve the con-
ditions under which its members do their work . . . 
may justify what would otherwise be a wrong. So 
would an effort to increase its members and to unionize 
an entire trade or business . . . Economic organization 
today is based on the single shop. Unions believe that 
wages may be increased, collective bargaining main-
tained only if union conditions prevail, not in some 
single factory but generally. That they may prevail it 
may call a strike and picket the premises of an em-
ployer wjth the intent of inducing him to employ only 
union labor ... Resulting injury is incidental and must 
be endured." 
There are three very recent cases to the same effect from 
the states of Tennessee, Colorado and Arizona: Pueblo Build-
ing Trades Council vs. Harper Company, 39 LLRM 2398; 
L. A. Flat, Complainant, vs. Barbers' Union, defendant, 39 
LRRM 2585 and International Brotherhood of Carpenters 
Local 857 et al vs. Todd L. Storms Construction Company, 42 
LRRM 2116. 
Independent of the foregoing sources of labor's right to 
peacefully communicate its messages to others, is its right of 
free speech in the 1st and 14th Amendments of the U. S. Con-
stitution (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; AFL vs. Swing, 
312 U. S. 321). While the U. S. Supreme Court has given 
more weight in intra-state jurisdictional cases to certain other 
rights growing out of state declared public policy (Teamster 
Local vs. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 40 LLRM 2208), the 
Court, in interstate cases, having there not "retreated" (using 
the expression in the dissent of Justice Douglas) as it has in 
the intra-state field, has been careful to preserve this basic 
means of labor to further its economic self interest because the 
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Taft Act is not so restrictive as the law in many of the states, 
nor as restrictive as some Courts have thought it to be, as will 
be seen in the recent "Sand Door Case" hereinafter considered. 
But first, we wish to emphasize that any restrictions upon 
picketing intended by Congress in the Taft Act were limited 
and specific, and in no sense involved a repeal of labor's basic 
right to picket. Obviously, to avoid and prevent a too-easy 
invasion of these rights, Congress spelled them out in Sections 
2(3), 2(9), 8(c) and 13. These sections make it clear that 
labor's long established right to picket shall not be invaded 
unless otherwise specifically provided. The exceptions are 
stated explicitly and can be pinpointed. As to such, it should 
be required of plaintiff to offer substantial evidence. This, 
plaintiff has failed to do. But in the confusion of a compli-
cated case, the defendants have been stripped of their rights 
by nothing more than incompetent, self-serving, hearsay testi-
mony full of infirmities, and without probative value. 
The principle that the rights reserved to unions are not 
to be diminished except as specifically provided by the Act 
has recently been treated again by the U. S. Supreme Court 
in an opinion which applied to three cases before the Court, 
each requiring an interpretation of "hot cargo" clauses in col-
lective bargaining agreements when an 8 (b) ( 4) violation 
was involved, the question being: was such a clause a defense 
to an 8 (b) ( 4) violation? Since there has been so much judicial 
expression which has appeared to equate 8 (b) ( 4) with a 
general, all inclusive, definition of secondary boycott, the 
Court, in defining the limited area which the Act proscribes, 
says: 
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"Whatever may have been said in Congress preceding 
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act concerning the 
evil of all forms of 'secondary boycotts' and the desir-
ability of outlawing them, it is clear that no such 
sweeping prohibition was in fact enacted in 8 (b) ( 4)-
(A). The section does not speak generally of secondary 
boycotts. It describes and condemns specific union 
conduct directed to specific objectives. It makes it an 
unfair labor practice for a union to induce employees 
to strike against or to refuse to handle goods for their 
employer when an object is to force him or another 
person to cease doing business with some third party. 
Employees must be induced; they must be induced to 
engage in a strike or concerted refusal; an object must 
be to force or require their employer or another person 
to cease doing business with a third person. Thus, 
much that might argumentatively be found to fall 
within the broad and somewhat vague concept of sec-
ondary boycott is not in terms prohibited. A boycott 
voluntarily engaged in by a secondary employer for his 
own business reasons, perhaps because the unioniza-
tion of other employers will protect his competitive 
position or because he identifies his own interest with 
those of his employees and their union, is not covered 
by the statute. Likewise, a union is free to approach 
an employer to persuade him to engage in a boycott, 
so long as it refrains from the specifically prohibited 
means of coercion through inducement of employees." 
Local 1976, Carpenters v. NLRB, June 16, 1958 (Sand 
Door and Plywood Co.) Sup. Ct. of the U. S., 42 
LRRM 2243. 
To summarize, defendants have been given by Congress 
the right to peaceably express their views by picketing or other-
wise, in any way they choose, except as such activity comes 
within certain specific restrictions; and unless their conduct 
comes within the specific limitations, this right is not affected, 
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even if, in the exercise thereof, it should result in economic harm 
to other employers or the public in general. The only limitation 
to this right, so far as this case is concerned, is that by such ex-
pressions the defendants may not ( 1) induce employees of an 
employer, ( 2) to concertedly refuse to handle goods of their 
employer, ( 3) if an object thereof is to force the employer 
not to do business with any other employer. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter makes it clear that until ( 1) above is established, there 
is no need to consider ( 2) or ( 3) . Since ( 1) is not established 
for the reasons heretofore argued, we ask this Court to restore 
to the defendants their rights reserved to them by the Act. 
We offer one final word on the points herein discussed. 
We do not contend that the picketing was motivated only 
because the lower wage rates being paid by Gossner were 
tending to depress wage rates elsewhere in the economic area 
involved. We have referred to other reasons in connection 
with the New York picketing. But there is still another 
reason, implicit in the record, but so far perhaps without 
explicit expression. It is this: that for two years following the 
Board's order to Gossner to bargain with the union he, never-
theless, refused to do so. The result was that Gossner' s em-
ployees stopped paying their union dues, and there was, there-
fore, talk of membership suspension. For the same reason, 
the picket sign read: "Non-union employees." This was the 
inevitable and precise result which Gossner would naturally 
expect (and hope) from his failure to follow the Board's order. 
What else could the union do to protect itself and those 
whom it represented in the area but to fight back and 
use the economic means which the Constitution, the Courts 
and Congress had provided ? If ever there existed moral or 
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economic justification in a labor dispute for picketing to protest 
the unfair conduct of an employer, it existed here in the union's 
effort to overcome Gassner's adamancy to bargain and his 
violation of a Board order to bargain with this union, and to 
regain the position with Gassner's employees which the union 
once had, and which it is reasonable to expect it would have 
continued to have, but for its inability to get Gassner to do 
what the Board had ordered him to do. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THE INTERNATIONAL IS A STRANGER TO THIS 
CAUSE. 
We believe we failed to make our position clear in this 
respect, perhaps because of our over-confidence, or over-simpli-
fication or our inability to adequately express ourselves. How-
ever, we are so convinced respecting this ground which the 
trial Court raised (Tr. 341), that we therefore approach 
the question from a different direction. We invite the Court's 
attention to the first and basic pleading, the complaint herein, 
which is the same now as it was at the beginning of the law 
suit-not a word has been changed or amended. 
Nowhere in the complaint do the words International 
appear except by reference to the caption. Nowhere in the 
complaint does it appear that the International is a labor union 
or a corporation or a partnership. Nowhere in the complaint, 
and this is of great relative importance, does the word "agency" 
or "agent" appear, or that the International has agents. No-
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where in the complaint does even a remote suggestion appear 
that the complaint embraces other than a pure, pristine, com-
mon-law action for malicious conspiracy on the part of this 
defendant. No federal act is referred to in the complaint. The 
complaint is silent respecting the words Taft-Hartley or Labor 
Management Relations Act or any other Federal Act. State 
court jurisdiction rather than federal jurisdiction was chosen. 
Whereas, on the other hand, there looms in big neon a demand 
for $50,000.00 for punitive damages against three joint indi-
vidual defendants as well as this defendant as joint conspirators. 
Quite plainly, the Federal Act never entered the mind of the 
scrivener of such pleading, or if it did, it carried no freight 
on his train of thought, for it is elementary that the Federal 
Labor Act permits no such suit for punitive damages nor does 
it permit such suits to stand against individual defendants. 
Obviously, the complaint on its face pleads facts which 
oust and supercede the state court of its jurisdiction while on 
the other hand the complaint sets forth facts which squarely 
vest such jurisdiction exclusively within the NLRB because 
and by reason of the fact that it alleges certain tractor-trailers 
were purchased for the purpose of transporting cheese and 
other types of merchandise in interstate commerce; but no-
where in the complaint does it allege the essential and necessary 
authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission to so 
transport such freight in interstate commerce. After the Inter-
national had vigorously protested the service of process and 
jointly filed a motion to dismiss and made a rather convincing 
argument that the complaint stated a perfect case of Board 
jurisdiction; that such state court jurisdiction had been super-
seded by the Congress of the United States; then and at that 
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time, plaintiff made no attempt to dismiss its demand for 
punitive damages or its demand for judgment against the in-
dividual defendants, but it did come forward with a rather 
unusual contention in such circumstances that the complaint 
pleaded a cause under the LMRA and its allegations were so 
intended. 
When the first labor act was enacted by Congress in 1935 
and again when it was overhauled in the 1947 Taft-Hartley 
Amendment, the fundamental principles were not touched 
or trenched upon but basically remain the same to this day-
that is to say, employees have the legal right to act together 
for their mutual aid or protection and this is the heart of our 
federal law now. 
We therefore find ourselves limited exclusively within the 
four corners of the LMRA hereinafter called the Act for both 
our adjective and substantive law which here control. The 
plaintiff must first prove five essential elements by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence before it may prevail, ( 1) it must 
prove that the International is the type and class of organiza-
tion defined in the Act, ( 2) that defendant's agents committed 
the tort complained of, ( 3) that such agents were authorized, 
( 4) that such agents acted within the scope of their employ-
ment, ( 5) that the process so served was served upon a labor 
organization defined in the Act, while at the very time such 
agent or officer was acting in his capacity as such officer or 
agent-and in this respect service under the law of the forum 
is more restrictive. 
The Evidence Excludes the International From the Act 
Pursuant to Section 303 (a) of the Act, plaintiff must 
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prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the Inter-
national is a particular type of labor organization, one that 
does not fall into the classification of a state federation of 
labor, or a city federation of labor or the usual national fede-
ration. It must be a labor organization that bargains, similar 
to a local or joint council or to a United Mine Workers mono-
lithic or district type of organization. The definition of labor 
organization in the Act was expressly and intentionally limited; 
otherwise, the various chambers of commerce, luncheon clubs, 
state and city federations of labor would be included, because 
they daily deal with labor relations problems. But they do not 
bargain-employers do not participate and bargain with em-
ployees. Such organizations are exempt and exactly the same 
pattern follows in Section 2 ( 2) of the Act where bank, hos-
pital, railroad and state employers are excluded and in Section 
3 ( 2) of the Act where domestic, agricuture and certain rail-
way, etc., employees are excluded. 
The fact that it would have been heedless, needless and 
stupid for the International to step out of its traditional func-
tion and inject itself into a purely petty local situation or 
horn in on joint council organization ventures over which it 
could not control and did not control or that the International 
with a mere handful of officers and representatives would be 
helpless to take a hand in the bargaining of more than 1000 
locals and 70 joint councils whose exclusive business is bar-
gaining, may be lightly ridden ov~r. Nevertheless, there is not 
a hint in the complaint or an iota of evidence in the record that 
the International is a labor union as defined in the Act or that 
it can or does bargain wherein employers or employees par-
ticipate, while on the other hand, an affirmative assumption 
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arose that employers may not, can not and do not participate 
respecting such bargaining. 
Agency Is Not Allowed or Proven on the Part of the 
International 
Perhaps because the word "agent" is not found in the com-
plaint and "agency" is not alleged in the complaint respecting 
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and that the 
plaintiff apparently made no effort to prove agency on the part 
of the International, we may have been induced to take too 
much for granted, and oversimplify our position. That Lott 
and Rash were both agents and trustees of the Joint Council 
and Ballew, an employee of the W>stern States Dairy Council 
and on temporary loan and that the Joint Council was the 
sole and only picketing entity, accounts perfectly for the mo-
tives, purposes and agency of these men during their two brief 
appearances on the picket line. Neither of these men drew any 
salary, wage or commission from or were connected with the 
International or under its orders. Aside from it being a sense-
less and useless thing, there was no occasion for the Inter-
national to horn in on the grievance. 
Where our adversaries become detoured is in persuading 
this Court to be impressed by and quote from the San Francisco 
Longshoremen's case, 226 Fed. 875. That case does not treat 
or dispose of the point we here discuss. The case squares entirely 
with our view. The precipitate and central point of that case 
was "scope," that is to say, after the party asserting agency as 
a first essential to the establishing of the fact of agency then 
such party has the burden of proving the second essential, to-
wit: that the agent's particular activity was within the "scope" 
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of that agency and the Court properly held in the Longshore-
men's case that when an International union puts an officer 
into a position where he violates the Act, then, and in such 
event, the International union is liable for the legal conse-
quences, but that is a far cry from the fact and applicable law 
we have here under consideration. In the instant case, the 
defendant proved that Lott, Rash and Ballew were not em-
ployees or agents of the International, notwithstanding the 
burden of so proving was upon the plaintiff. The record here 
is absolutely silent respecting the second essential, namely, 
scope; whereas, in the Longshoremen's case, a smallish Inter-
national, Meehan and Goldblat were the established officers 
and agents of the Longshoremen's International and very 
obviously engaged in a sequence and continuity of activity 
directed and supervised by the Longshoremen's International. 
The Court peremptorily instructed the jury on the fact but there 
is no showing or admission, and, of course, no instruction in 
the case at bar that Lott, Rash and Ballew were agents of the 
Teamster International or that such International could or 
would be interested even from an observation standpoint in a 
parochial and at that time a small grievance. 
There simply was no issue of fact respecting agency 
treated in the Longshoreman's case; agency was no problem. 
The International officer who triggered, implemented, and 
managed the entire operation in the Longshoremen's case was 
directly and definitely a representative and an agent of the 
International. The portion of that case the Utah Court quotes 
and refers to is a part of the Court's decision respecting strictly 
the issue of "scope" raised in the following instruction which 
appears in the same column and page. 
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"The evidence shows that during the time covered 
by the controversy Louis Goldblatt \Vas an officer and 
:Matt Meehan, \Villiam Gettings, Henry Schmidt and 
Eoward Bodine were agents and representatives of 
the Defendant International, and that Robert Baker 
and \Vilfred 1\:Iackey were officers, and that Toby Chris-
tiansen and Matt Nleehan were agents and representa-
tives of Defendant Local 8. It is for you to say whether 
what they did, if anything, in committing or assisting 
in the commission of the acts charged, or any of them, 
or in entertaining any objects or purposes, if you find 
that such acts were committed or that such objects were 
entertained, was within the scope of their employment." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
Of course, as the Circuit Court says, there is precious 
little case law on agency features of Section 301 of the Act. 
That is to be expected because only on rare occasions could and 
would it arise that an agent would deny the identity of his 
principle or his employer or under whose directions he worked, 
while on the other hand, the question of the scope of the 
agent's employment frequently arises, especially as it did in 
the field of master and servant law prior to the advent of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act when a goodly portion of this 
Court's attention was devoted to the question of whether an 
agent was acting within the scope of his employment when the 
careless act complained of arose. 
The same miscomprehension ensues when our adversaries 
cite, and this Court quotes from the case of United Mine 
Workers vs. Patton, 211 Fed. 2nd 742; in that case the Clinch-
field Coal Corporation were encountering an argument from 
the District organization of United Mine Workers because its 
small truck mines were operating both union and non-union 
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and when Patton's truck lease was revoked, he asked the 
Company what to do and the Company advised Patton to get 
in touch with the field representative of District 28 (the or-
ganizing arm of the United Mine Workers), which he did 
and thereupon entered into a full union shop agreement with 
said field agent. Thereafter Patton asked the lessor whether 
they would have to operate union and was told by the Company 
that Patton should decide that matter for himself. Where-
upon Patton decided to repudiate his union agreement with 
the United Mine Workers field representative and go open-
shop and non-union. Following this turn-about on the part of 
Patton, the other truck mines operating on lease from the 
Clinchfield Coal Corporation decided also to ignore the union 
and operate non-union and open-shop. Consequently, the 
entire operation was struck by the district organization field 
agent which, of course, included the operations of the big 
operator and lessor, the Clinchfield Coal Corporation. The 
strike lasted a week but work was resumed at Clinchfield 
operations under a threat from District 28 that if the recently 
open-shop operated truck mines commenced mining again 
non-union and open-shop, then in that event the whole opera-
tion would be struck again within a week. Thereupon the 
Clinchfield Coal Corporation notified Patton that because his 
lease had not been executed and signed, he should cease opera-
tion. Thereafter, Patton filed suit against the United Mine 
Workers and recovered damages. The judgment, however, 
was reversed on appeal, but not on the question of agency. 
Obviously the fact of agency on the part of the field represen-
tative could not and did not arise because the United Mine 
Workers under its particular method of organization was doing 
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the on-the-spot organizing under the so-called John L. Lewis 
District 50 plan, hence the field agent negotiated the labor 
union contract with Patton (which Patton repudiated), called 
the strike off and made the threats against the Clinchfield Coal 
Corporation. The fact of agency was assumed and admitted 
but the appellant raised the question of "scope" of agency, 
not the fact of agency; that Patton did not produce adequate 
proof that the appellant ratified or specifically authorized its 
field representative to call off and on the strike. Other than 
the damage element, the central point of the case is clear. It 
is set out by the Court in the case at bar in its decision quoting 
the Fourth Circuit Court decision. 
"The chief argument of defendants in support of 
their motion for directed verdict is that there is no 
evidence that they authorized or ratified the strikes upon 
which plaintiffs rely for recovery. It is true that there 
is no evidence of any resolution of either the United 
Mine Workers or District 28 authorizing or ratifying 
the strikes. There is evidence, however, that the strikes 
were called by the Field Representative of the United 
Mine Workers, who was employed by District 28, and 
that he was engaged in the organization work that was 
being carried on by the international union through 
District 28, which was a mere division of the inter-
national union. Members of the union are members of 
local and district unions as well as the international; 
and of the $4.00 monthly dues paid by them, $2.00 
goes to the international union, $1.00 to the local union 
and $1.00 to the district organization. It is clear that 
in carrying on organizational work the field represen-
tative is engaged in the business of both the inter-
national union and the district and that both are re-
sponsible for acts done by him within the scope and 
course of his employment." 
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It will be readily observed from the above instruction 
that the fact of agency as so infrequently occurs was not an 
issue but the scope of agency as frequently occurs was. Simply 
stated it was-did the actual and proven field agent of the 
United Mine Workers act within the "scope" of his employ-
ment; that is to say, was the strike activity of the field agent 
authorized by the United Mine Workers or was it subsequently 
ratified? The Court, of course, held against the mine workers 
under the provisions of the Act, as it should have in our opinion 
on the question of scope, but the fact of agency was no problem 
and it was not raised for the reason United Mine Workers 
were doing the organizing and the field agent was in the midst 
of all this organizing of the truck mines when this repudiation 
of contract on the part of Patton and reprisal strike occurred. 
The field agent negotiated the union contract with Patton, 
called the strike, made the threat, and called the strike off. 
Whereas, in the instant case, an entirely different picture 
and situation is presented. We grope in a factual vacuum for 
any agency at all. The fact of agency is neither alleged nor 
proven; in the Patton case there seems to have been an abun-
dance of proof of fact of agency. Only scope was the issue. In 
the case at bar, the Joint Council, and the Joint Council only, 
on the two very brief occasions picketed the truck. The record 
shows clearly and without dispute that neither of the picketeers 
were on the payroll of the Teamsters International or in their 
employ or in anywise connected with the Teamster Inter-
national, whose business none of this was and who presump-
tively knew nothing about it; certainly no evidence was pro-
duced that the International knew anything about it, because 
perhaps that was the fact; therefore no proof existed. The 
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motives, occasion and reason for the picketeers' brief appear-
ance at the Gossner truck are perfectly accounted for because 
Rash and Lott were trustees of the defendant Joint Council 
and the Joint Council was the sole and only organization to 
picket and no one seems to cast even a hint contrary to thf' 
fact that the Joint Council was independent of any other OI· 
ganization-completely autonomous and free from influence 
from any quarter. Only Mr. Gassner's obsolete trucks it seems 
operated under the influence of influence. 
The reason plaintiff does not allege agency we do not 
know. But assuming that it did, he who alleges agency has 
the burden of proving agency. Surely it would be convenient and 
easy of proof-if it were true. No particular search or diligence 
would be required. False records and perjury may not be 
assumed, especially respecting what was then deemed a matter 
of relative small consequence. Assume further that the Inter-
national gave advice and counsel to Messrs. Lott, Rash and 
Ballew (which it did not). To advise is not to control (Re-
statement of Agency, par. 1); to approve, confirm or not to 
approve or confirm is not conduct that carrieswith it respon-
sibility (ibid 82, 83, 85). This is not our conclusion but the 
law of the land established by the final arbiters in such matters 
-the Supreme Court of the United States. More than a quarter 
century ago a case arose in which an International officer 
much more clearly gave advice, guidance, direction, etc., to 
a subordinate union in which the International much more 
clearly, not only refused to interfere but affirmatively indicated 
its approval of the subordinate's alleged wrongful activity, 
which was marked by violence and unlawful conduct on the 
part of the subordinate union officials and members. Yet 
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there the Supreme Court twice refused to find the International 
Union had thereby made such unlawful activity on the part 
of the subordinate union its own activity so as to impose upon 
the International responsibility for such consequences. In those 
cases, the Supreme Court tested the responsibility as this Court 
must test on the basis of the common-law principle of agency. 
It twice concluded, speaking through Chief Justice Taft, infra, 
that even this far stronger evidence of acquiescence and coopera-
tion on the part of the International definitely did not establish 
International ratification, authorization or participation of 
such activity. And in our humble opinion, the Utah Supreme 
Court should never be satified with less as a basis of imposing 
liability on the International at bar or anyone else. The fact 
that the Act provides that whether specific acts "actually 
authorized or subsequently ratified" shall not be the sole and 
controlling factor does not change the common-law principle 
one jot or tittle and is completely to no avail in deciding 
whether one person is acting in fact as the agent of another 
and thus cut off then proceed to find liability upon some vague 
and shadowy theory of agency scope, or authorization in the 
absence of adequate proof of other factual attributes of the 
agency principle. If the Court is so minded to take the time, 
it will be found in the history of the Act that the United States 
Congress was perplexed and dissatisfied with the opinion in 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters vs. United States, 330 U.S. 
395, and was more or less in agreement of the position of 
Associate Justice Frankfurter in his able dissent, but this dis-
affection on the part of the Congress made crystal clear that 
the Congress was not returning to those ancient and archaic 
vestiges of rule by bench-made injunction law of forty years 
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ago which have been typed as misapplication of the law of 
agency to the end that the labor union was held accountable 
for the conduct of mere card-carriers in whom was lodged no 
authority to exercise the power of the union. We humbly and 
respectfully suggest that if the decision at bar is to stand, it 
will be used throughout the country in an attempt by mer-
cenary-minded employees to return to those early decisions 
whereby the laboring men and women of America were domi-
nated and shackled and their organizations crushed. During 
such era the phrase "Philadelphia lawyer" originated, because 
it was he who dreamed up the highly successful union-busting 
doctrine of ruin and rule by injunction. 
The Court's decision in this respect is one of first im-
pression and because it is the first and a bench mark case and 
because it will tend to fix the decisions of later decisions on 
the same subject matter-decisions that will determine the 
course of industrial controversy and the rights of employers 
and employees in the years ahead-we have thought it neces-
sary to state our views at length concerning this matter of 
such great importance. Notwithstanding, the Court's decision 
involves a large claim for money damages arising under what 
we believe to be suspicious and capricious circumstances, 
nevertheless, its resolution may readily establish a new de-
parture and landmark decision in the evolution of agency not 
only in the field of labor relations but the entire general field 
as well. 
In the case of United Mine Workers of America vs. Coro-
nado Coal Company et al, Chief Justice Taft decided: 
"Communications from outsiders and editorials 
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published in the United Mine V/orkers journal, giving 
accounts of the occurrences at Prairie Creek, and rep-
resenting that the troubles were due to the aggression 
of the armed guards of the mine owners, and that the 
action of the union men was justified, because in 
defense of their homes against night attacks, do not 
constitute such ratification by the board or the president 
after the fact as to make the International Union liable 
for what had been done." 
"The argument of counsel for the plaintiffs is that 
because the national body had authority to discipline 
district organizations, to make local strikes its own, 
and to pay their cost, if it deemed it wise, the duty was 
thrust on it, when it knew a local strike was one, to 
superintendent it and prevent its becoming lawless at 
its peril. We do not conceive that such responsibility 
is imposed on the national body. A corporation is re-
sponsible for the wrongs committed by its agents in 
the course of its business, and this principle is enforced 
against the contention that torts are ultra vires the 
corporation. But it must be shown that it is in the busi-
ness of the corporation. Surely no stricter rule can be 
enforced against an unincorporated organization like 
this. Here it is not a question of contract or of holding 
out an appearance of authority on which some third 
person acts. It is a mere question of actual agency, 
which the constitutions of the two bodies settle con-
clusively." 
Coronado Coal Company vs. United Mine Workers of 
America, 268 U.S. 295, a later case, Chief Justice Taft wrote: 
"It does not appear that the International Conven-
tion or Executive Board ever authorized this strike or 
took any part in the preparation for it or in its main-
tenance, or that they ratified it by paying any of the 
expenses. It came within the definition of a local 
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strike in the constitutions of both the national and 
district organizations. The district organization made 
the preparations and paid the bills. It was sought on 
both trials to bring the International in by proving 
that the president of the national body, John P. White. 
was in Kansas City and heard of the trouble which 
had taken place on April 6 at Prairie Creek, and that 
he reported it to the International Board; and further 
that in May he made a long speech at a special con-
vention of District No. 21, held at Fort Smith, Ar-
kansas, for the trial of one of its officers for corrup-
tion, in which he referred with earnest approval to 
the great International Union strikes in Colorado and 
West Virginia, but made no specific allusion to the 
Prairie Creek difficulty. It was also argued that com-
munications from outsiders and editorials published 
in the United Mine Workers' journals giving an account 
of the occurrence at Prairie Creek, and representing 
that the troubles were due to the aggression of the 
armed guards, and that the action of the union men 
was justified in defense of their homes, expressed such 
sympathy with the union men as to constitute a ratifi-
cation by the International Union because the United 
Mine Workers' journal was an authorized publication 
of the Union." 
So far as our search discloses, the latest expression upon 
the subject is a United States District Court of Columbia 
decision by Judge Holtzoff, decided May 28, 1958, 42 LLRM, 
Page 2169, which holds: 
"The mere fact, however, that Districts were con-
stituent bodies embraced within the International Union 
and that locals were constituent bodies ambraced within 
the Districts, does not in and of itself make either the 
District or the local an agent of the International 
Union. This circumstance, in and of itself, does not 
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make the International Union answerable for the 
actions of the District or of the local union. This point 
came before the Supreme Court in United Mine Work-
ers v. Coronado Co., 259 U.S. 344, 395. In that case, 
Mr. Chief Justice Taft held that District organizations 
were not agents of the national body and the national 
body was not responsible for the actions of the District 
organizations. He said in part: * * * 
"'But it is said that the District was doing the work of 
the International and carrying out its policies and this 
circumstance makes the former an agent. We can not 
agree to this in the face of the specific stipulation 
between them that in such a case unless the Inter-
national expressly assumed responsibility, the District 
must meet it alone.' 
"And again, he says: 
" 'We conclude that the motions of the International 
Union, the United Mine Woarkers of America, and 
of its president, and its other officers, that the jury be 
directed to return a verdict for them, should have been 
granted.' 
"That case, too involved the calling of a strike which 
was claimed to have been in violation of law. The 
action was brought under the Antitrust Act, but this 
circumstance does not differentiate the decision from 
the case at bar in principle. 
"A more recent case was decided in the Fourth Cir-
cuit, in which the late lamented Judge Parker wrote 
the opinion, United Construction Workers v. Haislip 
Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 36 LRRM 2315. He there 
held that the regional director of a union and its field 
representative were not agents who could bind the 
National organization. 
"Plaintiff's counsel stresses the argument, however, 
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that under the constitution of the International Union 
and of the District, the president of the District or-
ganizaion is appointed by the president of the Inter-
national Union. The mere fact, however, that officers 
of a constituent body may be appointed or selected by 
the head of the larger National organization does not 
make the officers of the constituent body agents of rep-
resentatives of the National body." (Emphasis ours.) 
On July 24, 1958, the National Labor Relations Board 
held in the case of Electrical Workers Union and Sherman P. 
Rock, 42 LLRM 1301: 
"The overwhelming weight of judicial authority, 
including the Supreme Court of the United States, is 
that a local union is a legal entity apart from its inter-
national and that it is not a mere branch or arm of 
the latter. That too has been the position of the Board. 
If the local in this case is merely an administrative 
arm of the IBEW International, the Board has been in 
error all these years in requiring that locals of the 
IBEW as well as of other international unions comply 
with the filing requirements of Section 9 (f), (g), 
and (h) of the Act. And if locals are only 'administra-
tive arms,' and not separate entities, they are probably 
incapable of withdrawing from their internationals, as 
for example when the internationals are ousted from 
the AFL-CIO. 
"Probably no international union regulates the affairs 
of its locals more closely than does the United Mine 
Workers, yet, beginning with the Coronado cases, the 
Federal Courts have consistently refused to find that 
locals of the Mine Workers are mere branches of the 
International so as to make the latter automatically 
responsible for the legal wrongs committed by the 
locals. 
"If the Respondent local is not merely an adminis-
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trative arm of its international, the latter's responsi-
bility for any specific conduct of the former must be 
determined by the ordinary rules of agency. Unless 
Johnson, acting within the scope of his authority, par-
ticipated in, ratified, or encouraged the continuation 
of the strike, responsibility cannot be attributed to the 
Respondent International. In this connection, the 
authority of Johnson to ratify must rest on actual and 
not apparent authority. 'Here it is not a question of 
contract or of holding out an appearance of authority 
on which some person acts. It is a mere question of 
actual agency ... ' The Trial Examiner concluded that 
Johnson did not have the authority to ratify the con-
duct of the Respondent Local. We agree with him.'' 
(Emphasis ours.) 
We especially invite the Court's attention to a Utah case 
in which the factual record is ten-fold stronger in behalf of 
plaintiff than is the record in the case at bar and a case which 
cities United Mine Workers vs. Patton, supra: Adamson 
vs. United Mine Workers, 3 Utah 2nd 377, 277 P2d 922, 
35 LLRM 2439. In that case there was evidence that one Harry 
Mangus said he represented U.M.W. of A., the International, 
and who said no more coal would be produced until the mine 
was organized into the International, nor until the agreement 
was signed by John L. Lewis, the President of the International, 
and by the said Harry Mangus. The said Mangus delegated 
Skinner and Rice to round up the men so that the mine could 
operate the next morning, but because no dit"ect evidence was 
put into the record that the International controlled the picket 
line, this Court held there was no implied agency by ratification 
and that the fact of authorization and ratification on the part 
of the International as a matter of law was not proven; that 
is to say, the indispensible fact, agency must first be proven 
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:fc 
directly, not upon implication before scope, authorization or 
ratification may be established. This Court held: 
"We believe that before the lower court could prop-
erly submit the question of agency to the jury, the 
burden was upon plaintiff to present facts in evidence 
which would sustain a verdict, and the evidence must 
do more than raise a conjecture or surmise that the 
ultimate fact is as allegei The Court in Toledo, St. 
L. & W. R. Co. v. Howe, 191 Fed. 776, as quoted by 
this court in Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Min. Co., 55 Utah 
151, 184 P. 802, announced the rule as follows: 
"It (the substantial evidence in support of a material 
element) must be, as said Judge Severens, 'something 
of substance and relevant consequence, and not vague, 
uncertain, or irrelevant matter not carrying the quality 
of "proof" or having fitness to induce conviction.' " 
"Plaintiff contends that the very nature of organiza-
tion of the International Union is a sufficient indication 
of agency. However, plaintiff fails to define the scope 
of the agent's authority, and, indeed, does not clearly 
designate just who is or what constitutes the agent or 
servant acting within the scope of his or its authority 
and employment. 
"Plaintiff's case is made no stronger by the authori-
ties involving the International Union of the United 
Mine Workers of America as a party. See United Mine 
Workers of America v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742, 33 
LLRM 2814; United Construction Workers v. Labur-
num Construction Corporation, 75 S.E. 2d 694, 32 
LRRM 2470. The evidence contained in those cases, 
reviewed on appeal, serves by marked difference to 
emphasize the absence of appropriate proof in plain-
tiff's case." (Em ph a sis ours.) 
Pennsylvania Mining Company vs. United Mine Workers, 
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28 Fed. 2nd 851. In this case, the facts respecting International 
agency were at least as strong or stronger as they were in 
the Coronado cases supra against the International. However, 
the Court instructed a verdict in favor of the International. 
Ford vs. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc., Sep-
tember, 1957, 315 Pac. 299: 
"But it is a recognized rule in cases involving labor 
union locals, which are subordinate components of the 
international unions but have a prescribed indepen-
dence in the management of their internal affairs, that 
the international will not be held liable for obligations 
incurred or acts done by the local in the ordinary 
conduct of the latter's affairs in the absence or par-
ticipation in or ratification of those obligations or acts. 
Seidner v. Fish, 131 Misc. 203, 226 N.Y.S. 411; Di-
Maio v. Local 80-A, United Packinghouse Workers of 
America, 29 N. J. Super. 341, 102 A.2d 480." 
Our learned adversaries make an attempt to respond to 
our position by saying that Jack Annand was a trustee of Local 
976 and there abruptly it drops the matter. Thus, a great void 
is left open and all without an occupant-so what-without 
something more in the record that statement is a mere mean-
ingless recitation. The burden is theirs, not ours. However, 
the record speaks for itself and affirmatively and definitely 
shows the contrary, to-wit: that Local 976 is a completely 
autonomous local union (Tr. 124-6), completely independent 
of any other organization; that Jack Annand was President of 
Joint Council 42, but had never been in Ogden in his life; had 
never written a letter to Local 976; that Local 976 negotiated 
and signed all of its contracts by and through its own officers. 
There is no dispute of course that Local 976 members 
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paid dues to the International and to the Western Dairy Em-
ployees Council, as some or all of them no doubt paid to the 
Elks, Kiwanis, Republicans, Democrats or Presbyterians, but 
certainly such dues-paying affiliation does not mean that such 
membership could act for the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters without some grant or express authority any more 
than they could act for the International organization of Elks, 
Republicans, Democrats, Kiwanis, or Presbyterians. This 
comparison may seem somewhat extreme; nevertheless it ap-
propriately is illustrative of our adversary's position. 
Generally, agency arises from an agreement expressed in 
fact, wherein the agent is clothed with authority to do those 
things and those things only that the principle can do. This 
arises because the law of agency is perhaps an outgrowth of 
the law of master and servant-for the acts of the servant in 
the scope of his employment, the master is liable. Agency 
generally can be revoked at any time but a trust may be revoked 
generally only on termination of the trust. A mere trustee 
cannot make the creator of the trust or a beneficiary of the 
trust liable to third parties. So what Jack Annand or the Inter-
nation could, would or did do in attaching liability to or 
through the Joint Council is completely unknown. 
The record shows without dispute that Teamsters Local 
Union 976 was a wholly autonomous organization (Tr. 124-
126), entirely emasculating any contention that some other 
organization such as the Joint Council, the Western Conference 
of Teamsters or the International could dictate, would dictate 
or did dictate to this local union the manner in which its mem-
bership should run its affairs. And to make plaintiff's case 
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doubly groundless, the record discloses here without dispute 
that Teamsters Local Union 976 engaged in no picketing ac-
tivities. 
Little wonder then that the Trial Court said he had a 
problem in this respect (Tr. 140) and pondered why the 
International should be held responsible for the actions of the 
Joint Council, who actually did the picketing, and expressing 
his doubt from the bench. 
A legion of practical illustrations lights up in one's mind 
which would upset such an argument. Assume that the record 
shows a local trustee case; that the secretary of the International 
had authority to say to Jack Armand, "Teamsters Local Union 
976 is not being run in the best interest of the membership; 
they are continually fighting and quarreling among them-
selves. I want you to take over their money affairs, negotiate 
and execute all unfinished and pending contracts for and in 
the interest of the membership and give them all the advice 
and assistance otherwise you can until such time as the matter 
is straightened out." Whereupon, further suppose that the 
membership decided to call a wildcat strike or breach a valid 
existing contract while such matter is being straightened out 
and then a suit for damages ensues. Under the present statute 
and case law, the International would be manifestly exempt 
from liability. 
Assume further under such circumstances that Jack 
Annand was given the above instructions and he got lost and 
the local union wrongfully engaged in secondary activity. Like-
wise, the International could not be held responsible. 
Assume further that Jack Annand after receiving such 
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:r: 
l'' 
instructions decided not to interfere and the local union became 
involved in actionable secondary activity, the International 
would be exempt from such liability. Assume that the Inter-
national had the authority and so delegated such authority to 
Jack Annand and he came into Utah to personally visit in-
definitely and notified the membership of the local that hence-
forth he was going to negotiate all contracts, collect and handle 
all collections exclusively, always, of course for and in behalf 
and in the name of the membership, until such time as the 
membership ceased its quarreling and bickering and then pro-
ceeded to do just that. Whereupon, such membership promptly 
said, "Nuts to you, Brother," and struck the big Weber Central 
Dairy in breach of their contract and the Dairy sued the local 
and the International for damages. Obviously under the statute 
and the case law, no liability would attach to the International. 
When Jack Annand was appointed, if he was duly ap-
pointed, what authority he did or could exercise if any; what 
his duties were if any; what authority he exercised if any; what 
power the International could grant if any; what duties or 
functions he performed if any; to what extent if any, the 
functions he may have performed disturbed the traditional and 
usual operation of the local union if any; are all left to the 
imagination and we can't cross examine or serve a subpoena 
on that and a fortiori, whether design or impotence, it makes 
no difference, Local Union 976 very positively did no picketing. 
The same sort of feeble attempt is made to compromise 
Ballew in behalf of the International Union, wherein plaintiff 
claims on Page 46 of its brief: 
"It seems clear that Ballew on behalf of the Western 
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Conference and for the Western Conference, as part 
of the International Union, was in Utah for the specific 
purpose of helping the local union and that he did so 
... The Western Conference, the local union in Ogden, 
and the International Union let its representative get 
into a position where he could and did cause trouble 
of the kind complained of in this lawsuit and therefore, 
the local, the Western Conference, and the Interna-
tional are responsible for his acts under the statute 
and the decisions construing it. (Emphasis ours.) 
The above statement leaves us cold. In our opinion, it is 
a downright unwarranted assumption in an attempt to detour 
and pre-determine this appeal. The record shows without dis-
pute that Ballew was not in the employ of the International, 
nor under its direction, nor on its payroll, but on the other hand 
was on the payroll of an entirely different organization, to-wit: 
The Western States Dairly Employees Council (Tr. 126-141). 
The record further shows that the International either could 
or would not, and in any event did not exercise any supervision 
or direction or control over Ballew. If we have a ticket on our 
learned opposition's train of thought in this respect, it has 
run past the station. They seem to make no attempt to attach 
any liability whatsoever through and by the Joint Council. 
Perhaps they know too well this cannot be done and this they 
must if they prevail, because no one but the Joint Council 
participated in the picketing and that was done personally 
by and through the trustees of the Joint Council, namely, 
Messrs. Lott and Rash. Ballew was on temporary loan and was 
under the exclusive direction and jurisdiction of trustee Rash 
(Tr. 125-6), who was not on the payroll of the International 
or in no sense represented it in this matter. Hence, to claim 
that the Joint Council was the agent of the International 
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when the record shows without dispute and the fact is Ballew 
had been the employee for over three and a half years of the 
Western States Dairy Employees Council (Tr. 141), seems to 
us to be rather incomprehensible. 
We most seriously and earnestly submit that the plaintiff 
has taken a position here respecting the International not only 
at war and inconsistent with all of the applicable United States 
Supreme Court decisions but also with the decision of the State 
of Utah, supra, and all other circuit and district Federal ap-
plicable decisions that we can find. 
WHEREFORE, we respectfully submit the International is 
blameless and exempt from any activity herein mentioned on 
the part of the Joint Council. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE IS EXEMPT FROM LIA-
BILITY. 
We adopt in such behalf and respectfully refer the Court 
to the applicable authorities and reasons set out under Point V. 
At the outset hereof we invite the Court's attention to the 
answer of the defendant, Western Conference of Teamsters, 
wherein it expressly denies in Paragraph II thereof picketing 
on the part of itself or Local Union 976, and in Paragraph VI 
of the second defense in the answer of local Union 976, such 
defendant denies that it picketed, but in its third defense, there 
appears a statement attributing picketing on the part of said 
local union which, of course, was an obvious oversight and 
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inadvertence, because the picket signs (and they were ap-
parently prepared in Salt Lake City), notwithstanding the 
picket witnesses and other testimony established beyond any 
question of doubt the identity of the party picketing the truck 
which was the Council and not the local union. 
If the Western Conference of Teamsters is to be here 
found guilty of picketing the Gassner truck upon the theory, 
as the Court implies, that it and other teamster organizations 
are dues-paying affiliates of the International, then and in such 
event the applicable Court decisions we have read, such as the 
latest one from a sister western state, the Ford case, supra, 
are inconsistent wherein it held that an International will not 
be responsible for the acts of a subordinate in the absence of 
ratification, etc., and that agency must exist in fact and the 
mere fact that the International is interested in the acts done 
by the subordinate does not make the International respon-
sible. 
To otherwise hold would mean that every time an American 
local union engaged in actionable secondary activity, then in 
such event, every city and state federation of labor, confer-
ence, council and international to which such local is a dues-
paying affiliate, and practically all local unions are required 
to affiliate with one or more federations and councils-then 
all such city, state and national federations and councils and 
conferences would be responsible and liable and a wholesale 
over-hauling of their structural organization would promptly 
be in order. 
The Western Conference of Teamsters, according to the 
record, had no office or place of business in Utah. It neither 
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hired nor employed employees in Utah. It either could not 
or did not exercise any influence over the council or local re-
specting picketing aCtivities and of course it did not engage in 
any picketing activities. 
WHEREFORE, we submit in the first place that it was palp-
able error for the trial Court to submit the liability of the 
Conference to the jury and in the second place, the verdict was 
til so grossly excessive as to amount to an emotional effusion 
emanating from a biased and prejudiced jury. 
iZ 
:c:-
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS IS EX-
EMPT FROM THE DEFINITION OF THE ACT. 
The Western Conference of Teamsters is specifically ex-
empt from the definition of a labor organization set out in 
Section 2 ( 5) as follows: 
" ( 5) The term 'labor organization' means any or-
ganization of any kind, or any agency or employee 
representation committee or plan, in which employees 
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole 
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of em-
ployment, or of conditions of work." (Emphasis ours.) 
As will be readily observed, the definition is limited. Con-
gress expressly proscribed the definition so as to make sure 
the numerous organizations in which employees and employers 
do not bargain and participate are exempt, such as city and 
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state federations of labor, industrial councils, dinner clubs, 
etc., which daily deal with labor relations problems. 
If the decision in the case at bar is to guide and control 
future decisions in such respect, then it becomes one of great 
and far-reaching importance and consequence because and by 
reason of the fact it brings effectively under such definition 
all such labor and other federations which must take heed 
and direction because they have heretofore traditionally, in-
tentionally and organizationally, and we might say with 
meticulous exactitude, kept themselves aloof and out of the 
uninvited and unwanted continuous employee-employer bar-
gaining brawl. Their field, as a matter of common knowledge, 
is policy and politics. The Utah State Federation of Labor, for 
instance, is purely and simply a political arm of the American 
Federation of Labor. All AFL local unions were required to 
affiliate with one or more local federations of labor but said 
local unions surrender no bargaining autonomy. 
It is undisputed in this record that the Western Conference 
of Teamsters not only engaged in no employee-employer bar-
gaining but that it was not a labor (union) organization (Tr. 
125-149, 145-9). This evidence is not challenged, not even 
conjecture remained in the record for the jury to speculate 
upon. 
WHEREFORE, we submit the Western Conference of 
Teamsters organization was expressly exempt from the Act. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE 
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IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING 
BY THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF HAD A LICENSE OR 
PERMIT TO CONDUCT ITS INTERSTATE HAULING 
BUSINESS. 
Mr. Gossner, the President and General Manager of 
plaintiff, testified at some length about his operations in trans-
porting property in interstate commerce. He was certain in 
testifying that he did not have a permit or license to transport 
property in interstate commerce. All of his testimony as to 
those matters will be found in the Transcript, pages 81 to 84. 
In order that the Court may readily have before it such testi-
mony we have quoted all of such testimony in the Appendix 
of this Brief. We especially direct the attention of the Court 
to this part of his testimony. 
"Q. As a matter of fact, you didn't have an interstate 
commerce permit, did you? 
A. We had no in teres tate commerce permit. We had 
legal permits necessaryto operate on the highways. 
To my know ledge we had all the permits necessary 
we had to have to operate a corporation and per-
form the services that we were performing." 
It would seem self-evident that such evidence does not 
m the slightest degree support or tend to support a finding by 
the jury that plaintiff had a license or permit to engage in 
the transportation of goods in interstate commerce. The evi-
dence is clearly to the contrary, in that Mr. Gossner, the Presi-
dent of plaintiff corporation, stated in clear, concise language 
that plaintiff did not have such a license or permit. There is 
no evidence showing or tending to show that plaintiff did have 
such a license or permit. 
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In light of the fact that the Court has held that there is 
sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that plaintiff 
had a license or permit to engage in the business of transporting 
goods in interstate commerce, it would seem necessary to con-
clude that the evidence shows that plaintiff at the time here 
involved was a contract carrier, and as such required to have 
a license or permit to engage in interstate transportation of 
goods. Unless plaintiff was required to secure a permit or 
license to conduct the business of transporting goods in inter-
state commerce, there, of course, was no occasion to secure 
or attempt to secure a permit or license to engage in interstate 
commerce. However, if we are wrong in assuming that the 
Court held that the evidence conclusively shows that plaintiff 
was a contract carrier at the time here involved, we have as-
signed as error the failure to so find, such assignment being 
as follows: 
POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS A CONTRACT CARRIER AT THE 
TIMES INVOLVED IN THIS CONTROVERSY. 
It will be seen from the testimony of Mr. Gassner which 
was stricken that plaintiff probably picked up property it back 
hauled not related to the business. 
The testimony of Arnie Hansen, the bookkeeper, testified 
concerning the back haul on pages 212 to 216 of the Tran-
script. In order to have such testimony readily available for 
the Court we have quoted all of his testimony touching the 
matter of hauling property for payment of freight in the Ap-
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pendix of this Brief. \Ve especially call the following to the 
attention of the Court: 
"Q. Can you tell how much was collected by reason 
of hauling freight? 
A. No. I couldn't. 
Q. How long do you think it would take you to come 
with, say, a percentage figure giving the Court a 
figure of the total amount that resulted from back 
haul? 
A. That would be hard to do; it is from 1952 and up. 
Q. How long would it take to do it for a one-year 
period, say 1954? 
A. Oh, it would take probably a week to do it." 
POINT X 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS 
NOT ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING TO 
ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE AFFIDAVIT OF MR. COR-
BETT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL. 
In connection with this point and Point No. IX, it will be 
seen that if plaintiff had a license or permit to carry goods in 
interstate commerce, then and in such case, it had a right to 
carry goods upon which it made a charge for freight, and like-
wise the affidavit of Mr. Corbett would not aid the defense 
of defendants. However, it is defendants' position that under 
the facts disclosed by the record plaintiff, as a matter of law, 
was a contract carrier as defined by U.S.C.A. Title 49, Sections 
303, 304 and 309, and 311, 312, 315 and 322, referred to and 
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in part quoted on pages 95 to 97, both inclusive, of our original 
Brief. Especially is that true in light of the decisions by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit cited 
and analyzed on pages 98 to 100, both inclusive, of our original 
brief filed herein. We shall not reargue what is there said, 
but adopt the argument there made in support of this petition 
for a rehearing. 
We make this additional observation in support of this 
Petition for a Rehearing. It is a well-established rule of law 
that where a law requires that a license or permit is necessary 
to engage in a business that one who relies upon his right to 
engage in such business must allege and prove that he has a 
license or permit to engage in such business. See Rule 9 (c) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It will be seen from the 
reading of the fifth paragraph from the end of the opinion 
that the Court assumed that the burden was on the defendants 
to show that plaintiff did not have a license or permit. If such 
is the holding of the Court, it is the contention of defendants 
that the Court was in error in so holding. The burden is on 
plaintiff to establish his case. 
The Court held that the information contained in the 
affidavit of Mr. Corbett was available to defendants during 
the trial by way of discovery, or otherwise, and there is no 
showing of their nonavailability. It is true that there were some 
books kept by plaintiff's bookkeeper offered in evidence at 
the trial. An examination of such books will disclose that they 
are conspicuous for what they fail to show rather than what 
is shown by such books. When Mr. Hanson was asked for 
definite information as to the source of the income, he stated 
58 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
!~ 
:c: 
e·. 
.::c 
that it would require probably a week to supply such informa-
tion for one year, say 1954. The defendants had a right to 
assume that the plaintiff would produce and offer in evidence 
its entire records, and not pick out only the portion thereof 
which it deemed an aid to its claim for damages. The failure 
of the plaintiff to produce such records together with the 
testimony of its witness Hansen that it would probably take 
a week to furnish information as to the source of income for 
one year, made it necessary for defendants to bring the with-
held facts before the Court by affidavit. The facts revealed by 
the affidavit were timely made in conformity with Rule 60b ( 3), 
which provides that the court shall "grant relief from a judg-
ment for fraud whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party." As heretofore stated, if the evidence, contrary to de-
fendants' contention supports a finding that the plaintiff had 
a permit or license to engage "in the transportation of prop-
erty" in interstate commerce, it may well be that the error of 
the trial Court in refusing to permit the filing of the affidavit 
of Corbett was not prejudicial, otherwise such affidavit gave 
support to the claim that plaintiff was engaged in transporting 
property in interstate commerce without having a right to 
do so. 
POINT XI 
THE COURT ERRED BY IN EFFECT HOLDING THAT 
THE BOOKS OF PLAINTIFF WERE RECEIVED IN EVI-
DENCE AND PROPERLY SO RECEIVED, AND THAT AS 
SUCH TENDED TO SUPPORT CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. 
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We have discussed this phase of the case on page 91-92 
of the original Brief filed herein. We adopt without repeating 
the argument there made in support of this Point in support 
of our Petition for a Rehearing. 
POINT XII 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVI-
DENCE AS TO DAMAGES WAS NOT SO SPECULATIVE 
AS NOT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT. 
The fact (if as defendants contend as a matter of law, 
plaintiff was a contract carrier of property in interstate com-
merce without a permit or license) has a direct bearing on 
defendants' claim that the evidence is so speculative and 
uncertain that a verdict for damages is without support in 
the evidence, if, in fact, plaintiff did not have a license or 
permit to transport property in interstate commerce, there, of 
course, would be one further element of speculation for the 
jury to consider than there would be if plaintiff had such a 
permit or license. On pages 95 to 97 we have directed the 
attention of the Court to a number of the provisions of the 
Federal Transportation Act. It will be seen that before a 
permit to engage in interstate commerce may be granted, it 
is necessary for the applicant to comply with the provisions 
of the Act. It is also necessary for an applicant to establish 
the necessity for an additional means of transportation. It 
seems to be the uniform holding of the courts that one may 
not recover damages for profits that might be made out of 
a future undertaking. See 15 Am. Jur. 574, and numerous 
cases cited in footnote 17. Not only does the evidence in this 
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case have the frailty discussed in our original brief, but the 
fact that plaintiff might at any time be enjoined from con-
tinuing his business because it did not have the required 
permit, and may well have been unable to secure a permit. 
Profits made by plaintiff at a previous time while engaged in 
an unlawful business cannot be used as a standard for deter-
mining prospective profits. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 
277 Fed. 694, 21 A.L.R. 1506. Nor may a finding be based 
on surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation. It is a guess as 
to whether or not plaintiff could secure a permit to engage in 
interstate commerce. It is a guess as to how long plaintiff may 
make a profit out of the transportation of property in inter-
state commerce, and it is a matter of conjecture and speculation 
as to whether the Dormans were influenced to write the letter, 
Exhibit P4, on account of what was told the Dormans, or on 
account of any concerted action, if any, of Dorman's em-
ployees. That a Finding of Fact may not be sustained when 
based on surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation is the holding 
of the courts generally and by this Court in such cases as 
Higley v. Industrial Commision, 75 Utah 361, 285 Pac. 306; 
Karren v. Blair, 63 Utah 344; 225 Pac. 1091; Dern Inv. Co. 
v. Carbon County Land Co., 94 Utah 76, 75 Pac. ( 2d) 660; 
Spackman v. Benefit Ass'n of Mining Employees, 97 Utah 91; 
89 Pac. ( 2d) 490. We adopt what is said under Point I at pp. 
8-10 of this Brief in support of this Point. 
POINT XIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVI-
DENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING BY 
61 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE JURY THAT DORMANS REFUSED TO PURCHASE 
MORE CHEESE BECAUSE OF THE PICKETING. 
We again call to the attention of the Court the testimony 
of Louis Dorman, a witness called by plaintiff, who on cross-
examination testified that if a load of cheese were brought 
from the Cache Valley Plant, either by Dairy Distributors or 
common carrier truck or rail, Dormans would accept the same 
(Tr. 336-7). The other evidence touching that phase of the 
case is contained in Exhibit P -4 addressed to Cache Valley 
Dairy, which was received in evidence over defendants' ob-
jection. On page 105 of defendants' original Brief will be 
found a discussion of the claimed error in admitting such 
letter. We urge the Court to reconsider this Petition for a 
rehearing in light of the error in the admission of such evidence 
as set out in the original brief of defendants above mentioned 
and under the argument heretofore made in this Brief. 
POINT XIV 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVI-
DENCE DOES NOT REQUIRE A FINDING BY THE JURY 
THAT THE DORMANS WERE WILLING TO CONTINUE 
TO PURCHASE MORE CHEESE FROM THE PLAINTIFF. 
Much of what has heretofore been said under Point XIII 
is applicable to this Point. \\l e have this further observation. 
It is indeed difficult to understand if Mr. Gossner, as President 
of plaintiff corporation, was making the profits that it claims 
to have been making, and if plaintiff had a right to engage 
in carrying property in interstate commerce, why was not 
something done to enjoin the defendants from interfering with 
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plaintiffs operation? It is an elementary principle of law that 
one who is or has been damaged by the unlawful acts of an-
other must use all reasonable means available to minimize 
the damage. If authorities are deemed desirable to support 
such principle of law, numerous cases from state and federal 
courts will be found collected in footnotes to the text in 2 5 
C.J.S., Sections 32 to 36, pages 499 to 509. Among the cases 
there cited are: Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 76 Utah 141, 287 Pac. 931; Jankele v. Texas Co., 88 Utah 
325, 54 Pac. (2d) 425. We adopt what is said under Point I 
at p. 10 of this Brief in support of this Point. 
POINT XV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING THE VERDICT. 
We refer the Court to the authorities heretofore cited in 
support of this Point. 
POINT XVI 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANTS A NEW TRIAL. 
It will be seen that in the Court below defendants moved 
the Court to grant a new trial if it refused to grant a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
The grounds upon which the Motion for a New Trial was 
made are: 
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1. Irregularities in the proceedings of the court by which 
each of the defendants was prevented from having a fair trial. 
2. Surprise which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
3. Excessive damages given under the influence of passion 
and prejudice. 
4. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, and 
that the judgment rendered thereon is against law. 
In our original Brief on page 106 under Point XIV we 
have discussed the claim that the verdict is excessive. We 
have heretofore called to the attention of the Court the fact 
that the plaintiff offered in evidence only some loose leaf 
books which were barren of all information of the source of 
the income, and according to Mr. Hansen, the bookkeeper, it 
would require a week to furnish such information for one 
year. 
As to the verdict being excessive, we again direct the 
attention of the Court to what is said on pages 106 and 107 
of defendants' original Brief. 
So also was it manifest error to admit in evidence Exhibit 
4. We have discussed that error on page 105 of our original 
Brief. 
For the reasons stated defendants submit that a rehearing 
should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLARENCE M. BECK, 
A. PARK SMOOT, and 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Attorneys 
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APPENDIX 
Testimony of Mr. Gassner 
Mr. Beck: Q. Now, Mr. Gassner, you said something 
on cross examination respecting the back haul of 
Dairy Distributors trucks being a very profitable 
operation. I will ask you what was the nature of 
your certificate to haul over the public highway long 
line. 
Mr. Hanson: May it please Your Honor, I object to 
that question; we are getting far afield. 
There was no issue raised in the pleading and 
apparently Counsel has in mind he violated some 
Interstate Commerce Commission regulation. There 
was nothing in the pleading to this, and I object 
on the ground it is a variance of cross-examination 
and has no bearing on the issues here. 
Mr. Beck: Counsel puts in something about a haul. 
Mr. Hanson: There has been nothing with respect to 
hauling, they admit we are a corporation. 
The Court: Any question with respect to possible haul 
would be pertinent. I don't think any questions 
with respect to their conduct under any Interstate 
Commerce Commission Permit is under the scope 
of proper cross-examination, and for that reason the 
objection is sustained. 
Mr. Beck: I want to be frank with the Court and every-
body else. I am asking a question precisely to ascer-
tain what happened to his back hauls. 
The Court: Why don't you ask that question. The ob-
jection is sustained. 
Mr. Beck: Did you on your back hauls haul furnaces, 
pianos, automobiles, parts, and articles of that 
character? 
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A. There may have been an occasional haul like that. 
You understand it was under Interstate Commerce 
Commission regulations, any trucking firm could 
make an occasional pickup and pick up occasionally 
something not related to their business. We could 
have done that. I am not managing this corporation. 
I did not line up the back hauls on it. We have been 
checked by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
and the National Labor since the Union put pressure 
on us the last few years. We have had every agency 
I know check our books and we have come out 
pretty clean with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion too. 
Mr. Beck: I move to strike the last answer. It is not 
responsive. 
The Court: The answer is stricken. It is not responsive. 
The jury is to disregard it. 
Q. You would have back hauls in the nature of fur-
naces, pianos, automobile parts and articles such as 
those commodities ? 
A. I don't know we ever did. I don't know whether we 
did. I don't know when we closed. We closed 
naturally after we went out of business. 
Q. What were you hauling? 
A. The chief back haul was calcium chloride. I think 
that is the name for it. We picked it up-the Com-
pany picked it up in Ohio some place and just had 
a representative here yesterday or the day before 
checking why we were not picking it up again. That 
was one of our major back hauls. Of course, the 
Company purchased milk cartons in the state of 
New York and brought them into this area. 
Q. For whom were you hauling calcium chloride? 
A. For Dairy Distributors, Inc., and Dairy Distributors 
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sold it to different concerns in this Intermountain 
area. 
Q. You were m the merchandising business then, is 
that it? 
A. I would say so, yes. 
Q. What is calcium chloride? 
A. It is a by-product of chloride-of the chemical in-
dustry, just what exactly it is, what by-product it is 
-it is a residue of another industry. It is a by-
product and it is used out in this country by the 
manufacturers, or for retreads on tires and so forth, 
and also used in road construction in the winter-
time, that is, it is used in cement work and so forth 
in the wintertime, in the summertime it is used to 
settle dust on the highways to the best of my knowl-
edge. That is what they use calcium chloride for. 
We used it ourselves on dusty roads. 
Q. How many times did you haul a load of calcium 
chloride from Ohio? 
A. Thirty or forty times. We have record available. I 
don't know how many trips. 
Q. Are they in these records? 
A. The invoices were paid and so forth, and it will 
show in there. You will find it in there. 
Q. Did you haul calcium chloride pursuant to your 
Interstate Commerce Commission permit? 
A. We bought it and sold it out here, and to my 
knowledge you can haul anything your ownself on 
your own trucks. 
Q. As a matter of fact you didn't have an Interstate 
Commerce permit, did you? 
Mr. Allen: Your honor please, we object to that, being 
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incompetent. It has nothing to do with the issue 
in this case, it isn't pleaded. It is an attempt to cross 
examine this witness on something that is im-
material. 
The Court: That objection is overruled at this time. 
Mr. Hanson: We object to going beyond the scope of 
direct examination. 
The Court: He may answer that question. 
A. We had no Interstate Commerce Commission per-
mit. We had legal permits necessary to operate on 
the highways, to my knowledge we had all the per-
mits necessary we had to have to operate a cor-
poration and perform the services that we were 
performing. 
Q. N arne the permits you had. 
Mr. Hanson: Your Honor please, it looks to me like 
that is entirely beyond the scope of the direct exami-
nation. 
Mr. Hanson: I know he has. I think we are getting far 
afield. 
The Court: I think it may have a bearing. 
Mr. Hanson: I will withdraw the objection, if the Court 
wants to hear it. 
The Court: You may answer. 
A. I said to my knowledge we had permits. I had no-
body call to my attention we didn't have permits 
to do the business we were doing. We had our 
books and checks and nobody objected to the way 
we were doing business and the license I had refer-
ence to, it was anover-the-road permit. In some 
states you buy a permit to travel through the whole 
year, that is the permit I have reference to. 
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Mr. Beck: Move the answer be stricken as not respon-
sive. 
The Court: It may be stricken. 
Q. (By Mr. Beck): Will you answer the previous ques-
tion? 
A. I thought I answered it correct. 
Q. The q~estion was "Name the permits you operated 
under. 
A. I can't name them. 
Q. Did you have any permits ? 
A. I didn't know we needed any more permits than 
we had. 
Q. Then your answer is you don't know, or you didn't 
have, is that right? 
A. I don't know. 
Testimony of Arnie Hansen 
Mr. Arnie Hansen testified in part as follows: (Tr. 212 
to 216, both inclusive). 
That he was bookkeeper for Dairy Distributors during the 
time that it was engaged in business. 
Q. As I understand they (Dairy Distributors) had 
$35,000 when they opened business, started busi-
ness and $30,000 when they ceased, by this report. 
A. Yes. 
Q. A decrease of about $5000.00 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did they pay any dividends during the time they 
were in business ? 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. None at all? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Now, there has been some evidence here that cer-
tain goods were secured in the East? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did the Company itself buy that, or merely carry 
it here? 
A. They bought it. It was in the regular course of busi-
ness it was bought and resold. 
Q. Can you tell us the amount they paid for goods they 
bought? 
A. It would vary. 
Q. The total amount. 
Q. Can you tell from your books how much you got 
for it (goods) ? 
A. I couldn't do it offhand. I could go to the books and 
find it out. 
Q. How long would it take to do that? 
A. It would be quite a job because we haven't segre-
gated the sales, whether coming or going sales to 
us. I don't know what the sales or purchases have 
been. 
Q. You wouldn't attempt to testify to any portion of 
this, if there was any portion, the amount hauled 
on straight freight charge for hauling it? 
A. There could have been a single case. I don't know. 
Q. You couldn't tell? 
A. I couldn't tell exactly, no. 
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Q. Do you have an idea about it? 
A. There might be something hauled we charged 
straight freight for. 
Q. Have you any judgment. 
A. I couldn't offhand. 
Q. Can you tell how much money was collected by rea-
son of hauling freight? 
A. No, I couldn't. 
Q. Have you a judgment as to the percentage of the 
property purchased in the East and hauled here 
and re-sold ? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. You don't have any judgment at all about that? 
A. No, I don't. 
Elias Hansen: I don't know how I can get any further 
with the witness unless he can bring us some of this 
information. That is the thing I am interested in. 
Mr. Hanson: The books are here and available. 
The Court: How long do you think it would take you 
to come with, say a percentage figure, giving the 
Court a figure of the total amount that resulted 
from back haul? 
A. That would be hard to do, it is from 1952 and up. 
Q. How long woudl it take to do it for a one-year 
period, say 1954? 
A. Oh, it would take probably a week to do it. 
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